

30 SEP 1948

Approved For Release 2006/03/15 : CIA-RDP78-01617A006000040002-6

~~TOP SECRET~~

EUROPE

25X1

1. **FRANCE: Communist tactics against Gaullist units--US Embassy Paris reports that the French Communist Party has apparently directed its militants to attempt to break up every Gaullist meeting. The Embassy conjectures that the Communists hope to provoke gunfire from the strong-arm groups of De Gaulle's Rally of the French People (RPF). Communist propaganda has reportedly portrayed such incidents as attempts to bring about the dissolution of the armed groups of the RPF. An RPF representative has informed the Embassy, however, that De Gaulle's firm order against Gaullist interruptions of Communist meetings still stands.**

(CIA Comment: CIA believes that the Communists would welcome further provocation by RPF groups as an incentive for the Government to outlaw these groups. It is unlikely, however, that the Government could effectively disband these semi-clandestine units, although stronger governmental measures against further encounters between Communist and Gaullist militants can be expected.)

25X1

State Department review completed

Document No. 79

NO CHANGE in Class. ☐

☒ DECLASSIFIED

Class. CHANGED TO: TS S C

DDA Memo, 4 Apr 77

~~TOP SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2006/03/15 : CIA-RDP78-01617A006000040002-6

Date: 15 MAR 1978

25X1

~~TOP SECRET~~

A N N E X

30 September 1948

THE BERLIN DISPUTE IN THE UN

As a result of the breakdown of direct negotiations in Berlin, the western powers have been forced to refer the key issue dividing East and West to the UN, an organization not designed to cope with such problems. Because of the Soviet veto in the Security Council and the limitations upon General Assembly action, the UN will be unable to take complete action on the Berlin dispute unless the USSR modifies its present adamant stand. Although a Security Council demand upon the USSR to lift the blockade prior to resumption of negotiations, perhaps followed by a similar Assembly recommendation, would mobilize world opinion behind the West and provide moral justification for further action, such a demand could not, in the face of the Soviet veto, have anything more than a moral effect. Moreover, public UN debate, if so skillfully handled by the USSR that doubt is cast on the legal position of the western powers, can weaken the western case. The realization that recourse to the UN removes one more means of peaceful settlement and brings nearer a possible resort to force may shake the resolution of France and the UK as well as the smaller nations for the strongest possible UN action.

The Kremlin may, in recognition of the critical stage reached in Berlin, make some surprise conciliatory proposal which will be designed, if not to settle the issue, at least to pave the way for further negotiations. However, unless the Kremlin makes some such offer before the UN has taken what action it can on the case, the western powers will still be faced with these three choices: (1) withdrawal from Berlin; (2) maintenance of the increasingly difficult air lift; and (3) a resort to force. Moreover, UN inability to resolve the issue will result in a catastrophic loss of UN prestige.

Although the Kremlin may utilize the UN deliberations as an opportunity to compromise gracefully, it seems more likely that the USSR will stand firm, confident that the western position in Berlin is basically untenable and that Soviet UN representatives can make a good case. Initially, the Soviet Union will probably contest the right of the SC to deal with the issue, contending that matters concerning the peace settlements are the province of the

- i -

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Big Four. The USSR may furthermore seek to forestall SC consideration by maintaining that the question of whether the Berlin dispute is a threat to the peace is not a procedural but a substantive matter, hence subject to veto. It seems unlikely, however, that the USSR can succeed in barring Council consideration.

If the Security Council should handle the dispute, the USSR has two basic choices: to fight the issue in the SC, or to boycott the discussions, claiming that SC consideration is illegal. However, the Kremlin probably will contest the issue because a walk-out would prejudice the world against the USSR and because Soviet representatives can build a fairly strong case by alleging that western violation of the Potsdam agreements in building up western Germany has forced the USSR to retaliate. Besides continuing to deny that the Berlin dispute is a matter for the UN, the USSR probably will seek to blame the West for the whole dispute and for breaking off negotiations and will try to widen the area of discussion to cover the whole German question. In its efforts to broaden the issue and facilitate resumption of direct negotiations, the USSR may introduce some surprise proposal, such as immediate four-power withdrawal of troops from Berlin and eventual withdrawal from all Germany.

Because the Soviet case is in many respects a strong one, the western powers may have some difficulty in convincing a SC majority of the necessity for strong action. Syria is likely to abstain in protest against UN handling of Palestine; China may hesitate to antagonize the USSR too strongly; and Argentina may seek to play an independent role. These nations, holding the voting balance-of-power and conscious of the critical nature of the Berlin crisis, may seek the role of mediators and will be quick to seize upon any conciliatory Soviet gesture as a basis for urging renewed negotiations. However, the western powers will probably procure at least a bare majority for a strong resolution, thus forcing the USSR to use its veto. In such event, the West must seek outside means of settling the dispute, or carry the case to the General Assembly whose powers are limited to recommendation and mediation. Moreover, a number of smaller states in the General Assembly may be fearful of taking sides in the East-West conflict and will likely abstain, thus limiting the possibility of a clear-cut stand against the USSR.

- ii -

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Although Soviet propaganda has already hinted that unfavorable action on Berlin might lead to the withdrawal of the USSR from the UN, such action seems highly unlikely at present because: (1) the UN is tremendously useful to the USSR as a propaganda forum; (2) UN membership permits Soviet participation in the settlement of global issues and provides a means of obstructing the development of international cooperation; (3) the Soviet veto prevents any concrete anti-Soviet action; and (4) withdrawal would permit the western states to develop the UN as a strong anti-Soviet organization, thus isolating the eastern bloc. Consequently, veiled Soviet threats to withdraw appear more of a propaganda maneuver to weaken the resolution of the western powers for the strongest possible UN action and to intimidate smaller nations. If the UN should strongly condemn the Soviet Union, however, and if it should appear that world opinion were united against the USSR, Soviet withdrawal would become an increased possibility. Even then, only an overwhelming vote to modify the veto, which would deny to the Kremlin its main defensive weapon, would seem likely to induce the USSR to consider withdrawal seriously.

- iii -

~~TOP SECRET~~